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THE DINASOUR THAT DID NOT DIE: MEXICO'S PRI.

*"Cuando despertó, el dinosaurio seguía ahí."
Augusto Monterroso*

I. INTRODUCTION.

The PRI was once one of the most centralized political parties in the world, and led by each president of the nation in turn, it governed once of the most centralized authoritarian political regimes. The president singlehandedly chose candidates for several different elected posts, he dictated party programs for electoral campaigns, and he decided the votes of his party's legislators in the two Chambers of congress. Many analysts believed that the PRI would disintegrate if it lost the presidency because it would no longer have the overarching leader who could force the party's disparate political elite to cooperate and remain loyal to the dictates of the president and castigate those who chose to defy the presidential will. Once this party Leviathan was removed by voters in 2000, it was believed that the PRI would either fragment into several off-shoot parties or disappear altogether. However, this doomsday scenario did not come to pass.

This paper seeks to understand how the Party of the Institutional Revolution's (PRI) party organization changed and adapted during the past twenty years (1988 to 2008), a period that was characterized by the growth in electoral competition, dramatic reforms

in electoral rules, and the end of the PRI's control over the presidency and the two houses of congress. The question of party adaptation is important because the fact that Mexico's former hegemonic party did not collapse (and disappear) during the nation's protracted transition to democracy has played a large role in the stability of the party system and the political regime overall (Levitsky 2003). The PRI continues to hold 18 of the nation's 32 governorships and plays a crucial role in forming majorities in the legislative branch. One of the reasons the party did not become extinct at the ballot box as elections became fairer and more competitive was its ability to adapt to the evolving electoral environment in which it is now immersed.

This chapter hopes to add to the literature on party organization change by disaggregating the notion of "organization." Instead of simply examining whether or not the party was able to adapt to changing circumstances, it argues that one must first separate out different areas of party activity because by doing so, one can better pinpoint the incentives and limitations of different actors within the party, and thereby better capture variable successes and failures. This chapter will examine how the PRI altered its formal and informal procedures of candidate selection, its patterns of political recruitment, and its strategies of congressional campaigning. Other topics, such as ideological positioning, are also important, but because of space constraints, they cannot be addressed here.

Most authors believe that internal organizational change is usually the result of an external shock, such as electoral defeats (Harmel and Janda 1994; Katz and Mair 1992); yet, change does not come easy to many party organizations. Past practices form the best template for what should be done in the present and groups of like-minded bureaucrats and leaders can stave off changes if their positions are put at risk (Panebianco 1982). Even with exogenous shocks to the party, such as dramatic falls in

electoral support, some organizations resist adapting to new realities, and limp along for years doing badly at the polls or disappear altogether (Ishiyama 1995; 1999).

Many authors have come to the conclusion that it is not always useful to see party organizations as “black boxes” that will automatically either adapt to large-scale change in the external environment or disappear, as some authors would have it (Cotter, et al., 1989; Downs 1957). A newer current of work seeks to understand the actions of the dominant coalition within the party, or battles among potentially dominant coalitions, to pinpoint the causes of adaptation (Ishiyama 1995; Levitsky 2003; Panebianco 1982; Roberts 1998). Some authors concentrate more on the interests and potential payoffs of leaders (Ishiyama 1995; Koelble 1992), while others look more to the party’s institutional flexibility (Kitschelt 1994; Levitsky 2003; Roberts 1998).

By disaggregating party adaptation, we can first, better understand both the PRI’s successes and failures, which is impossible to do if one only takes one or two dimensions of party organization. Second, by examining many areas of action with a party, it becomes clearer that different leaders are in control of distinct elements of the party, which again, helps explain variation within the same party. Finally, it obligates us to be clear about the different tasks of a typical party. Not many works are explicit as to what they mean by organizational adaptation: some refer to electoral platforms and policy proposals (Koelble 1992; Roberts 1998), while other concentrate on the links between labor unions and parties or large groups of voters (Levitsky 2003; Wattenberg 1991); and others still mean candidate selection and campaign strategy.

Not all aspects of the party can change equally or equally successfully. How different parts of the party change in turn depends on the opportunities and the incentives of those party leaders in charge of (or those most involved in) that particular area of the party. Thus, certain kinds of leaders will resist change (unsuccessfully, in

many cases) because they believe they will not win benefits or because they are blocked by other powerful leaders or factions; while in other areas, leaders will enthusiastically adapt, because they believe they will be able to derive the benefits from doing so. So, to understand these different dynamics, organizational change must be broken down into distinct party activities.

Table 1. Different Aspects of Party Change in Mexico's PRI.

<i>Activity</i>	<i>No Change</i>	<i>Mixed</i>	<i>Major Overhaul</i>
Candidate Selection		X	
Legislative Recruitment			X
Campaigning			X
Congressional Discipline	X		
Ideological Positioning		X	

The PRI adapted successfully in some of these areas, such as legislative recruitment and campaigning, but its attempts to find several different solutions to the problem of presidential and gubernatorial candidate selection were not as successful. What explains the differences among these different parts of party organization? First, different actors controlled these areas, some of whom were able to respond to the central environment threat of greater electoral competition better than others, what other authors have referred to as leader flexibility (Kitschelt 1994; Levitsky 2003). Second, legislative recruitment and congressional campaigning were more decentralized under PRI hegemony (for the most part), which meant that lower level party leaders were able to adjust their strategies for defeating the opposition, without much input from the national party structures.

This of course adds a second dimension to the study of party organization change. The sub-national versus national party dimension can be critical to understanding how many party organizations react to a large-scale change. In many cases, where the local party affiliate or local leaders are already actively responding to the challenge of electoral competition, they will be better positioned to deal with it successfully and this will be encouraged or at least tolerated by national leaders (Downs 1998). The party's governors had incentives to choose candidates with close political allies, which dove-tailed nicely with candidates who were closer to the voters. Furthermore, it was in the interests of the NPL to allow the governors far more political space because the CEN continues to control millions of dollars of public funding and candidates for the PR lists.

It is important to note that the time period covered in this chapter extends from the late 1980s – before the PRI lost the presidency in 2000 – to after this defeat, up through the 2006 presidential elections. This period was chosen to show that PRI leaders made many attempts to adapt to the slow climb in electoral competition during the 1990s, while it still held the presidency, and of course, many more after it was voted out of Los Pinos.

The PRI was always characterized by its ability to unite disparate groups, factions, and ideological dispositions under a common party banner (Brandenburg 1962; Garrido 1982), even though it was considered an extremely centralized party led by each president in turn (Weldon 1997). Within the party several groups stand out, although it is important to note that their identity was always somewhat blurred and changing, because of the nature of elite circulation and turn-over, a process that was driven by the re-election prohibition and the accepted removal of top bureaucrats at the end of each six year term. As competition grew beginning in the late 1980s and into the

1990s (see Green 2007 and Magaloni 2006 for more on this process), different groups and factions within the PRI were able to take advantage of the enormous groundswell of electoral challenges, while others were swept away in its wake. The first set of actors is made up of those with a great deal of experience in the highest reaches of the party bureaucracy. Most of these party bureaucrats, whose ranks include Cesar Augusto Santiago, Rafael Ocegüera, and Hector Hugo Oliveras as representative examples, did not have static ambition and switched easily from legislative to party leadership posts, with many aiming to win their state's governorship. Together with each president in turn, Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), these leaders aimed to continue to win more competitive elections (often using any means at their disposal) without renouncing control over sub-national politicians, especially the governors. They held leadership posts in the CEN and were important actors in converting the party into a competitive electoral machine that could compete for votes as well as buying them.

The second group of players can be termed the bureaucratic technocrats (Camp 1990; Centeno 1994). Extremely well trained in specialized fields, including finance and macro-economic management, these bureaucratic insiders, such as Francisco Gil Díaz, Santiago Levy, and Carlos Tellez worked well under the new policy directives of the 1980s and 1990s. Their policy expertise kept them above the political fray; even if they had been proscribed from working in public service after the end of PRI domination, they knew they could earn more in private business. And as it turned out, their services were highly sought after during the first two PAN administrations. Simply put, these actors had little to worry about in democratic politics, and as a result, while they were important actors in the PRI regime, had little reason to either promote or prohibit changes to the party's internal practices or rules.

The governors (who last only six years in office and can never be reelected for the same post) form another group, whose members sought several things from the national leadership during the 1990s (and into the democratic era): first, more non-earmarked federal funds;¹ second, more influence over candidate decisions, especially their successors and federal deputies; and third, the informal right to run for the party's presidential nomination (which had been denied all PRI governors through informal mechanisms since the 1940s). In short, with the weakening of the PRI's hegemonic position at the national level, those PRI politicians who were still able to win state-level elected posts found they were far stronger than ever before. A great deal of the impetus for internal change came from the governors and their fights with the national leadership to garner more influence over what mattered most to them: candidate selection – especially for the federal deputies plurality single-member-districts (SMD) and their own successors in office (always chosen by each president in turn under hegemony) – and their continuing ambition to reach the presidency from the governor's mansion. This paper defines the regime's national leadership during PRI hegemony as the president, the Secretario de Gobernación, and the leader of the National Executive Committee (CEN). After the loss of the presidency in 2000, this paper refers to the national party leadership (NPL), which is the leader of the CEN and his closest allies.

The next group to be considered (and one that was far more permanent than the others) is composed of corporatist sector leaders, in particular, those from the Congreso de Trabajo, CNC, and CNOP. Organized labor in Mexico was a powerful part of the governing coalition, but only one of many. Industrialized and service workers belonged to a *mélange* of unions that were grouped together in the CTM (the most important labor central within the Congreso de Trabajo), the CROC, and the CROM. Peasants, especially those who lived on ejidos were organized into to the state level Ligas

Agrarias, which formed the backbone of the CNC (together with bureaucrats from the Secretaría de Reforma Agraria). Federal and state bureaucrats as well as teachers had their separate organizations that were then lumped into the far more amorphous CNOP. The leaders of the fragmented universe of Mexican labor groups, both local and national, were keen to maintain their privileges even after the on-set of electoral competition. Union members and local leaders had won quotas of candidacies to the Lower House of Congress, the local congresses, certain municipalities, and a small number of governorships since the early days of the PRI regime in the 1930s (Garrido 1982).² While the sectoral leaders of course wished to maintain the quotas of power, many of their leaders tended to be unpopular candidates for elected office (as recognized by many local party leaders). However, it would be a mistake to lump together all members of the corporatist sectors: the CTM (or Congreso de Trabajo) had far more trouble winning competitive elections than did representatives of the CNC (in certain rural districts) and the SNTE.

The weight of the industrial unions in economic negotiations was crucial through the 1980s. However, with the opening of the once-protected economy (Lustig 2002; Magaloni 2006) and Mexico's entry into NAFTA, the large-scale unions that belonged to the Congreso de Trabajo lost their ability to influence both economic policy and political negotiations. The regime's national leadership was more than ready to sacrifice labor's quotas to the Lower House in return for more favorable electoral returns, and did so beginning in the 1990s, despite labor's protests.³

One last group that should be considered is the party activists: those priístas who volunteered in campaigns, who came out to vote in primaries, who attended conventions, and who were once an enormous worry for the national leadership during the 1990s. National leaders since the 1960s had become concerned that because the

local party members had little say in policy making or candidate selection, the party was standing on a weak activist base.⁴ After the electoral debacle of 1988, this discussion once again came to the fore: why would anyone help the party if he was not given any sphere of influence over candidate decisions? Because the national leadership believed the party needed activists to volunteer, work, and vote for the party, in the early 1990s, Salinas attempted a radical decentralizing move in candidate selection, in which party activists would be allowed to vote in closed party primaries for their favored candidate for mayor, local deputies, and governors. However, the national leadership did not like the effects of devolving power to the local bases of the party because it made these leaders more autonomous, and so revoked its own reform (Langston 2001). Further down the road, the party's leaders came to a realization: they did not have to devolve decision-making power to the local activists because with the enormous financial resources the party received from IFE for campaigns, activist support was not in fact necessary to win elections. Television and radio appeals took the place of the once-important party members.

These different groups and actors within the party, with their variable strengths, will tell us a great deal about the changes that were considered most important and how the fights and negotiations played out during the course of the lengthy transition to democracy. As Sartori pointed out (1976), the greatest danger to a hegemonic party was not from outside forces, but internal splits. Much of the party's adaptation needs to be understood in this context: party leaders had to change party rules and practices to maximize their particular goals, while simultaneously meeting the challenge of growing electoral competition. At the same time, leaders had to deal with the emerging exit option that competition gave lower level party politicians: if a *priísta* was not happy with a party decision, he could now leave the party and run for another party label, with

some chance of winning the election, an option that was not possible when the PRI won almost every election with margins of up to 70 percent.

II. CANDIDATE SELECTION.

One of the fundamental questions to be addressed in this section will be why in the PRI there has been a profound change in both the level of centralization and inclusiveness in executive (gubernatorial and presidential), but not in legislative candidate selection, which has only been characterized by decentralization, but not in inclusiveness. A second question is why presidential selection continues to cause such conflict, while the gubernatorial process creates somewhat less, and the federal congressional selection has been less of a problems in terms of ruptures of conflict (aside from 2006). Schattschneider (1942) argued that by examining which organ of the party controlled the selection of candidates for elective office, one could pin-point the locus of power within the party. By controlling access to such a valuable resource, the “gate-keepers” exercised enormous influence over the future careers of ambitious politicians, and therefore, over the entire party (Ranney 1981).

During Mexico’s transition, the party’s governors became far more powerful than they had been under hegemony, and they were able to use this power to win control over candidate selection at all levels of government. During the 1990s, the state executives won control over millions of dollars in un-earmarked funds sent down from the federal government; they continued to win elections under more competitive circumstances; they helped win elections for other co-partisans in local and federal races; and they were able to mobilize party members in internal votes, such as the 1999 primary and the 2002 CEN election. The party’s governors have been crucial actors in forcing the NPL to institute primaries to select the party’s presidential nominee; in

opening up gubernatorial nominations and in allowing sub-national party bosses (including governors) to select candidates for SMD federal deputy races.

Ranny (1981: 82-89) writes that the candidate selection varies along several dimensions, the most important of which are centralization and inclusiveness (See also Gallagher 1988: Introduction). The level of centralization is determined by which unit(s) of the party make the selection decisions: by the national agencies with little participation by sub-national units (the cases of Israel, Venezuela, and Mexico before 1997, at least for gubernatorial and presidential selection); the national level after several suggestions by sub-national units (India, Japan, the Socialists of Italy, and Mexico in terms of federal deputy selection); regional units with national supervision (Italian Christian Democratic party before the mid-1980s; Mexico for mayors and local deputies, if one takes governors as the regional unit, both before and after democratization); at the constituent level with national supervision (United Kingdom); or constituency selection with no regional or national supervision (the United States) (198: 82).

The second dimension along which one can distinguish nomination procedures is the level of inclusiveness of those who participate in selecting candidates. Some parties, such as those in the US, hold closed primaries which are regulated by the states, not the parties themselves, while most hold conventions of delegates elected by the wider party membership (1981:88).

The PRI under hegemony was centralized in its candidate selection procedures, with the governors choosing most candidates for mayors and local deputies under strict national supervision. The national leadership (Secretario de Gobernación, president of the CEN, and president of Mexico) decided candidacies for federal deputies and senators, with the president of course choosing his own successor in office and deciding

upon most governors. Under non-competitive conditions, national level supervision over candidate selection was crucial in maintaining strict centralized control over lower-level politicians and party units. These included for example, the right of the national level leadership to write the specific rules (under the President's guidance) to determine the method (out of four or five possibilities written into the statutes) that would be used in the nomination of senators, federal deputies, and at times, governors. The CEN was also able to choose which type, from which sector, and which level of the party, the delegates to the nominating convention would come, if the convention method was used. The variety of methods in the statutes, and the vagueness with which delegates were chosen gave great discretionary power to the CEN to win its specific choice in nominations. These centralized rules worked well to maintain the PRI's political elite loyal and disciplined to the president's will, especially in a context of low electoral competition and no-consecutive reelection.

Electoral competition, however, changed the ability of the regime's leadership to impose candidates not only on voters, but also on its political elite. This section will discuss changes to presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional selection.

The party's nominee for president since the on-set of electoral competition has been extremely problematic for the PRI. The 1994 dedazo process, under the penultimate PRI president, Carlos Salinas, was carried out according to the traditional rules: the president kept his choice under wraps for as long as possible and finally unveiled his tapado, Luís Donald Colosio, in November of 1993. He had prepared his favorite by first placing him as the head of the CEN, and later moving him to a secretarial post that allowed him to distribute resources to important groups within the PRI (Sedesol), while giving him the exposure necessary to win a general election with few problems (Casteñeda 1999). However, the loser in the nomination process, Manuel

Camacho Solís, did not accept his defeat with the typical resignation seen in prior losing competitors. A few months later, the PRI's presidential candidate was assassinated during the campaign. However, Salinas was still able to place another favorite in as replacement candidate, who then went on to win the general election (Ernesto Zedillo, 1994-2000). The 1999-2000 selection process took place under radically different circumstances: the PRI had already lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies and Zedillo had negotiated a series of electoral reforms in 1996 that were first used in the 1997 mid-term elections that made corruption and vote stealing far more difficult, while better controlling the state's ability to spend government resources in an outlandish fashion.

With electoral competition a serious factor, and the fairness of the electoral process far better guaranteed, a rupture within the PRI over the presidential dedazo would certainly harm the PRI at the ballot box. Knowing this, the governors of certain states, especially Tabasco and Puebla, worked the National Party Assembly of 1996 to tie the president's hands in making his choice of successor. By changing the party's statutes to obligate the PRI's presidential successor to have prior elected experience before winning the nomination, the governors disqualified several favorites on the president's cabinet, while allowing the party's governors to become favored pre-candidates (for the first time since the 1930s).

When then-governor of Tabasco, Roberto Madrazo, demanded a primary in early 1999 to decide the presidential nominee instead of the formal method of a party convention (which would be determined by the party's leadership and have only one name on the ballot), he was overturning seven decades of party tradition. Because of the threat of a party rupture in a context of high competition, Zedillo acceded to his demands and called for an open primary, which took place in November of 1999. The

president and his hand-picked CEN president were still able to work the primary to the advantage of Francisco Labastida (the president's choice to replace him), and Labastida won the primary easily (with the help of the party's governors).⁵ Even so, a precedent had been set: no longer would the president of Mexico or the president of the party be able to determine single-handedly the outcome of the PRI's presidential nomination. Thus, the choice of who will lead the party's ticket is now decided in the most democratic, decentralized method available: an open primary. This does not mean, however, that the process necessarily works to the advantage of the PRI; both candidates chosen using this method have gone on to lose the general election (for many reasons).⁶

The problem for the PRI in selecting its presidential nominee is that its winner-take-all nature and the lack of acceptable rules of procedure (that is, the logistical component of how to run the primary, how much money to spend, whether to run it through districts or votes, how to sanction cheaters, etc) means that all viable pre-candidates have strong incentives to cheat. Without the presence of the party's Leviathan – the president of the Republic – actors cannot compete fairly as there is no guarantee that the other competitors will do the same (thus incurring the sucker's payoff). This has left the party's factional leaders battling among themselves and taking their fights to the media before the presidential election even begins. The party's Consejo Político Nacional (CPN) chooses the specific rules for the primary; so, he who controls the CPN can write the convocatoria to his best advantage.⁷

Selection for governors has followed a different path. During the hegemonic era, the gubernatorial candidates for the PRI were chosen by the president, with a great deal of input from Gobernación (which would have to work with the governors once in office). While it was once believed that the prime objective in gubernatorial selection

was to place state executives who would behave as appointed administrators of the president's will (Anderson 1971), in fact, studies have shown that governors were chosen both for their loyalty to the chief executive and their ability to keep the state under control politically (Langston and Díaz-Cayeros 2003). Since the 1950s, governors were by and large not allowed to place their favorites as their successors, although of course, this did occur at times (Heladio Ramírez, for example, in Oaxaca). Implementing this proscription was difficult and full of conflict as sitting governors sought to influence their state successions in order to maintain influence over the state. If politicians within the entity knew that the governor would be crucial in the selection, then they would be more loyal to their immediate leader because he could influence their political futures. If however, the national leadership made those decisions, then all politicians, even those in the states, had to remain obedient to the dictates of the national leadership. The sitting state executives were, however, permitted to prepare their allies to at least compete for the gubernatorial nomination, with a certain allowance of candidacies for both the Lower House and the Senate (the Senate being an important way-station to compete for the state nomination). PRI politicians who had been passed over in the nomination struggle had little recourse other than to accept his defeat and wait for a future opportunity.

As competition heated up in the 1990s, the PRI's gubernatorial hopefuls had more options: if they were denied the candidacy, they could leave the governing coalition and run under another party's ticket, with serious possibilities of winning. This exit option had not existed when the PRI exercised electoral domination as the disgruntled pre-candidate would know he would lose any general election against a PRI candidate. Layda Sansores, daughter of a former governor of Campeche, was among the first to leave the PRI in 1997, but lost the gubernatorial election to her former PRI

colleague. In 1998, however, the PRI lost the state of Zacatecas because of a split in the state party. This defeat in a state in which the PRI held an overwhelming advantage set off a series of changes in the selection of governors: first, the party instituted primaries in several states that elected governors between 1998 and 2001. The new method worked well in Chihuahua in early 1998 in large part because the PRI did not have a sitting governor who could use the state's resources to benefit his favorite. But when the primaries were used in states held by the PRI, such as Baja California Sur, in which the governor flooded his ally's primary campaign with resources, the losing pre-candidate left the party, joined the PRD, and defeated the PRI's candidate in the general election. The PRI after 2000 finally hit upon its new selection method (one that is considerably cheaper than a party primary, an important consideration now that the PRI does not hold the presidency); negotiated nominations between the CEN, the PRI governor (in those cases in which there is one), and leaders of strong state factions, with only the occasional use of primaries.

Negotiations among state factional leaders in states held by the PRD or the PAN are supervised by the president of the CEN with the party headquarters usually supporting the candidate it perceives to be strongest, or at least a particular favorite of an important party leaders. During the Madrazo presidency of the CEN, the CEN supported many state leaders who had helped him win the 2002 party vote to lead the PRI.⁸

The quest for the party's nomination is much different in PRI states because of the role played by the sitting governor, whose opinion is always critical to the general election outcome. The PRI's governors in Coahuila, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tamaulipas were able to place their favored allies in or around 2004-2005. However, not all of them have been successful at securing the nomination for a favored

ally: in several states, popular local politicians have been able to wrest the nomination away, especially if they have support from a national political figure (Veracruz in 2004) or have shown themselves capable of building an independent base in the state (Puebla 2005 and Tabasco 2006). Nonetheless, several problems and ruptures have caused the party to lose elections, such as the case of Chiapas in 2006, Guerrero in 2005, or Tlaxcala in 2005, or continue to forward unpopular candidates that are unable to compete well (Aguascalientes 2004; Guanajuato 2006; Jalisco 2006; Morelos 2006; Michoacán 2007).

The CEN has become less able to control the selection process but more adept at guiding negotiations to keep the factions from the state affiliate from ruining the party's chances at election time.

Finally, this section will consider how the nomination process for federal legislative posts changed from a more centralized selection to one shared between the governors and the CEN, with the governors taking control over most of the SMDs and the CEN responsible for the PR candidates. According to a former party leader, under PRI hegemony, the lists of SMD federal deputy candidates were generated by several party groups, both local and national.⁹ All sorts of groups and factions attempted to place their allies in the Lower House via the SMD districts (the PRI did not place list deputies until the 1988 elections due to a restriction in the electoral laws).

Governors (all members of the PRI until 1989) worked hard to win a few spots on the SMD lists, but had to compete with not only local factional and corporatist leaders, but also the national sectoral leaders, the secretaries of the president's cabinet, and members of the CEN. Several lists circulated in Mexico City in the weeks before the final decisions were made. The Secretary of Gobernación was actively involved in vetting the potential candidates for Lower House posts, and sent information on the PRI deputy

candidates to the CEN and the president. Thus, the selection of candidates was done in a multi-level, multi-faceted manner, with many groups involved, and the president and Gobernación took into account the preferences of several different party groups before making the final decisions.

With the on-set of competition at the ballot box, the national PRI was finally forced to decentralize most candidate selection for majority deputies, although their attempts to democratize the nomination process largely failed. Even before the PRI lost the 2000 elections, the PRI governors were granted far more influence in placing candidates than was seen under hegemony. By the mid-term elections for congress held in 1997, the PRI knew it would face stiff opposition at the ballot box. According to a party leader, the national leadership allowed the party's governors to place more allies in their respective states than was customary. This was done for very pragmatic reasons: first, the governors are the political leaders of their states and could make credible promises to keep losers within the party;¹⁰ second, they are able to spend far more resources in campaigns in their states' districts and thus, aid their co-partisans who are running for congress. This help takes the form of state workers who hand out flyers and paint bardas, money for organizing rallies, media time, and in some cases, campaign managers.¹¹

The governors hold an implicit weapon against the NPL regarding SMD candidacies; if the leaders of the CEN or the presidential candidate do not allow the party's governors enough say over congressional selection, they can withhold the campaign support for both the presidential and congressional campaigns, driving down support for both the presidential hopeful and his deputy counterparts. This is apparently what happened in the 2006 elections, when reportedly Madrazo changed the many SMD

candidates at the last moment, and many PRI governors then refused to support his campaign (Madrazo 2007).

The party's activists have not become important participants in the federal deputy selection process, unlike the presidential and in certain instances, gubernatorial nominations. The National Assembly in 2002 reformed statutes and so in the mid-term election cycle of 2003, the PRI instituted the new party primaries for its SMD candidacies, with the proviso that this rule would not hold for districts in which the PRI ran in an alliance with another party. Almost two-thirds of the SMD candidates were supposedly chosen in party primaries (consulta a las bases) in this election, but many rumors circulated that many (more than half) of these were primaries were faked, with only one name on the ballot. One former PRI leader remarks that the then-president of the CEN, Roberto Madrazo, had won the party presidency in 2002 with the promise of more decision-making power for lower level activists, and so changed the statutes to please this constituency;¹² but when the selection process began in 2003, he astutely manipulated the rules to give the governors more influence.

Table 2. Changes in Informal Candidate Selection within the PRI, 1990-2005.

Post	Traditional Form	New Form
President	Presidential dedazo	Conflict-ridden open primary
Governors	Presidential dedazo; Gobernación influential	First primaries, then bi-level negotiations
Federal Deputies	Negotiated among many groups and sectors	Governors choose SMDs, CEN chooses PR
Senators	Presidential dedazo	Negotiated among governors, CEN, and state groups
Local Deputies	Governors with CEN oversight	Strong governor influence; negotiated with local factions
Mayors	Governors with CEN oversight	Strong governor influence; negotiated with local factions

One sees that while candidate selection has become more decentralized, the party's activists are not much more likely to participate in the choice of candidates than

they had been in 1980s, except for the presidential nomination. Governors, on the other hand, have been quite effective in winning far greater influence over the selection process than they were in the hegemonic era. Why is this the case? In large part, the party does not need to rely on party activists for many of the tasks which can be paid for using public resources channeled through the IFE. There seems to be little to gain from allowing activists the right to choose candidates for local, state, or federal posts (except the presidency) if their services are not needed to win elections. On the other hand, the CEN has had little choice but to partially devolve selection control to the governors after 2000 because it has lost its once-supreme party leader in the president. There is no actor who can now punish a recalcitrant governor who wishes to place allies in congress or aid his loyal political ally in the gubernatorial selection process. Governors receive their financial resources from the federal government in a far more rule-bound manner under PAN Presidents than they did under their PRI predecessors. But the CEN has not lost out completely: the nation's electoral institutions (which party elites from the three major parties participated in making) deliver millions of pesos of public funding every year (and even more in election years) to the national leadership (specifically, the Secretarios de Finanzas). Thus, the party leaders continue to control large sums of money (as do the governors). Furthermore, the CEN of the PRI retains either influence or control over certain posts, such as the PR lists for both federal deputies and senators, and SMDs in non-PRI states. Therefore, while the governors are far stronger than they were under PRI dominance, the CEN continues to be a major force.

IV. LEGISLATIVE RECRUITMENT.

Pippa Norris (1996) states that to understand the process of political recruitment one must examine who selects candidates, the formal rules, and the informal decisions-

making process and the supply of candidates who come forward. Thus, candidate selection and recruitment are intimately related. However, it is worthwhile examining them separately to understand better the outcomes of the process of candidate selection, in particular to the Lower House of Deputies from the 1980s to 2006. During the PRI era, the objectives of the negotiated recruitment to the Lower House were many: first, to keep the numerous party groups and factions, both those that were more based on ideological principals and those that were organized around personalities, working within the system; second, to maintain a balance among different levels of government, by allowing governors and local political groups to win federal posts; and finally, to give the corporatist leadership quotas of power (but not policy influence) in the legislative branch of government. The cabinet secretaries also were given slots so they could send highly trained operatives to congress to guide important pieces of legislation through the Chamber. The electoral threat was almost non-existent in many districts, so electoral popularity was not considered an important consideration until the 1990s. Thus, legislative recruitment under PRI hegemony was the by-produce of countless decisions that collectively added up to a set of mid-level political elites that entered the congress every three years.

The table below shows the political group that each PRI deputy candidate belonged to in the 1985 mid-term election cycle. For each SMD, the deputy's professional background was taken into account to assign him to the group that helped him reach the Chamber. For example, if the deputy had been a member of his state's government for the several years prior to winning the candidacy, then he was assigned the state government group. If the deputy's recent prior posts were mostly in the federal bureaucracy, he is part of that category. Complications arise when the deputies take part in both state government and posts within the corporatist sectors, so an effort was

made to determine which came first, the work in the state political arena or the sectoral leadership post.

Table 3. True Group Affiliation of Winning PRI Candidates in SMDs, 1985.

SECTORS	Number	Percentage
National	37	
State	84	
Sub-total	121	46%
NON-SECTOR		
Federal government	42	
National party	2	
State government or political faction	99	
Sub-total	143	54%
Total	264	

Table prepared by author from data taken from *¿Quién es quien en el Congreso de la Unión?* and from *El diccionario biográfico del gobierno mexicano*. The national sectors include those from the CTM, CNC, and CNOP, as do those from the state sectors category.¹³ I thank Ignacio Marván for his help with this table.

From the 1985 figures, it becomes clear that many different types of groups won candidacies to the Lower House in the period just before the opposition began to make great strides in winning SMDs. These figures also help show that the corporatist sectors were not nearly as strong as one might have thought; corporatist leaders made up under half of the universe of total PRI candidates in the 1980s. Furthermore, governors and state political groups were given many opportunities to place allies on the lists (whose members then went on to win semi-automatic electoral victories).

Table 4. National versus Sub-national Groups, 1985.

National Groups	30.6%
Sub-Natl Groups	69.4%
Total number	264

Numbers taken from table above.

Here, national posts include federal government, national sectors, and national party posts. The sub-national groups include those from the state government, the state party, and local sectors. By disaggregating the posts into local and national, one can see

that almost 70 percent of all PRI deputy winners came from sub-national politics, an important corrective to the idea that Mexican politics was completely centralized during the PRI hegemonic era.

The changes to legislative recruitment began in the early 1990s and gathered steam by the end of decade, even before the PRI lost the presidency in 2000. The effect of the difficult 1988 elections – both presidential and congressional – on the PRI was profound: the PRI leadership under Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and his handpicked CEN president Luís Donald Colosio, worked to weaken the sectors' influence in the negotiations for candidacies in the Lower House (Pacheco 1992). This trend continued during the sexenio of Ernesto Zedillo. Leaders of the workers' unions were especially hard-hit as they were seen as the unpopular candidates who could not win elections in most districts.

As we have seen, the PRI governors have strong incentives to place as many of their allies in the Lower House as possible to help them show their popularity as governors; to maintain a strong presence in Mexico City, which helps them with the annual budget negotiations; and finally, to prepare several of their followers to compete to become their successor. The governors under democratic conditions do not choose national level political leaders to compete in SMD districts; rather, they look to their local allies who are closer to the voters in their localities because they are better known, thanks to their local elected or government experience. Love (2007) has shown for the 2006 SMD PRI deputy candidates that they tend to hold more experience in the local political arena than their PAN and PRD counterparts and that this type of background also helps them do better at the polls. Thus, “good” candidates for SMDs are those who are more tied to their localities, even without the strong electoral connection that re-election would create. Once the PRI lost the presidency, the CEN of the PRI had every

incentive to allow even greater decentralization of both candidate selection and legislative recruitment because first, it could win more districts and maintain its large presence in the Chamber; second, it would keep the PRI governors working within the party coalition; and finally, the national leaders still controlled the selection to the PR lists, and so could maintain a strong presence in congress without having to win a difficult district level election.

If recruitment has changed since the on-set of electoral competition, then one should expect to see two major differences: first, a drop in the number of corporatist leaders who win elections in 1985 as compared to 2000 (information on candidates could not be found) and second, important differences between the SMD and list deputies. Because the PR deputies do not have to win a direct election, their ranks should be full of national party and sector leaders. (In a future version of this paper, 1988 deputies for both SMD and PR will be included, as will 2003 deputies).

Table 5. True Affiliation of Winning PRI Candidates, 2000.

SMD Deputies			PR Deputies			2000 Totals		
Sectors	Num	%	Sectors		%	Sectors		%
Nat'l sectors	2		Nat'l sectors	13		Nat'l sectors	15	
State sectors	20		State sectors	7		State sectors	27	
Sub-total	22	17	Sub-total	20	26.3	Sub-total	42	20.7
Non-Sector			Non-Sector			Non-Sector		
Federal govt	4	3	Federal govt	16	21.1	Federal govt	20	9.9
National party	2	2	National party	13	17.1	National party	15	7.4
State govt	62	49	State govt	20	26.3	State govt	82	40.4
Local factions	22	17	Local factions	2	2.6	Local factions	24	11.8
Sub-total	90	71	Sub-total	51	67.1	Sub-total	141	69.5
Business	15	12	Business	5	6.6	Business	20	9.9
Total	127	100		76	100		203	100

Table prepared by author from data taken from *¿Quién es quien en el Congreso de la Unión?*. The national sectors include those from the CTM, CNC, and CNOP, as do those from the state sectors category.

What is most remarkable is the sharp drop off in the number of deputies who are leaders of local or national sectors, a figure that falls from 46 percent in 1985 to only 21

percent in 2000 (and 17 percent of the SMD deputies). The CNC and the SNTE have managed to maintain some presence in the SMDs, but CTM winners are almost entirely gone. The national CTM leaders won no SMDs, and local leaders won only four, while, the local peasant leaders won 7 and the local popular sector leaders won nine. The PR lists offer some hope, but not to local corporatist leaders, only their national counterparts. Another interesting difference is that the federal bureaucracy (which was still controlled by the PRI when the 2000 candidacies were decided) no longer bothered to try to send its people through the SMDs. As one would expect if the governors are deciding to send many local allies to the Federal Congress, a very large percentage (49 percent) of the SMD deputies came from state-based groups. Not all of these deputies are allies of the governors, but many of them will ally with him during their stay in the Chamber. PRI politicians who have never held a state post now win nominations and district elections: those from municipal factions. This is another important change, and probably one caused by greater electoral competition as these politicians tend to be very well known in their localities. Even the PR lists held many state politicians (20 percent), which tell us that while almost all the national party leaders win a seat through the PR lists, not everybody from the lists is a national leader.

As expected, the PR deputies hold much more experience in national posts than do their SMD counterparts: for example, 21 percent of the list winners have held a post in the federal government, versus only 3 percent from the districts. Over 17 percent of the PR deputies have been members of the national party compared to only 2 percent of the SMD winners. The national and local sectoral leaders show similar differences (17 percent of list deputies were members of a national sector versus 1.5 percent for SMDs).

Table 6. National versus Sub-national Group Affiliation of PRI Deputies, 2000.

	2000	SMD	PR	Total
National Groups		6%	55%	25%
Sub-National Groups		94%	45%	75%
Total Number		127	76	203

Numbers taken from table above.

Again, if one breaks down these numbers between national and sub-national affiliation, it becomes clear that SMD recruitment has become even more decentralized in terms of the politicians who are drawn into the federal congress, and how much the national party leaders depend on the PR lists to continue to participate in the national legislature.

V. CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNING.

In terms of congressional campaigning, the PRI adapted well to the demands of electoral competition, in large part because the deputy candidates had always been responsible for the bulk of electioneering activities in their respective districts and because the governors had long experience with aiding their co-partisans in campaigns. The CEN simply changed its role from monitoring the individual campaigns to buying mass media time and devising a national strategy to sell the party label as a whole.

One can identify several interesting differences in federal congressional campaigning between the competitive and hegemonic eras. First, the pressures of competition, the institutional setting, and the rules that control campaign financing have all acted to homogenize campaign styles for the three main parties in Mexico. Second, and most likely because of the flow of public campaign resources from the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) to the CEN, the national headquarters has modernized its side of campaigning at an astounding rate of speed, and now uses national media appeals to promote the party label as a whole. Most candidates in the districts, however, are less

likely to use innovative technologies, such as data bases, mass mailings, or media advertising (aside from radio). Third, candidates can now be distinguished more by the type of district they campaign in than by the party label they sport: deputy hopefuls in competitive districts are more likely to use more modern appeals at the same time they reach out directly to the voters via personal contact. Electioneering in rural, non-competed districts is similar to the old-fashioned campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s, with the proviso that mass rallies have become less popular. Finally, deputy candidates spend a great deal of effort in targeting different types of precincts in their districts and designing different strategies for strongholds, competitive areas, and those that are considered hopeless.

Both the institutional and Mexico-specific literatures provide overwhelming expectations for party-centered campaigns during the long period of PRI hegemony. However, interviews and electoral data suggest that many candidates organized and managed their local campaign efforts themselves and in many instances could not rely on party resources to support their district-level campaigns, either because the party was weak or because the local notables were not satisfied with the candidate the national leadership had imposed. Yet, clearly this type of campaigning was not candidate-centered either: the candidates' personal image did not matter much to voters, the candidates could not self-nominate, and they did not finance their campaigns. We call these hybrid alternatives to party or candidate-centered efforts "candidate-managed" campaigns.

Almost all Chamber of Deputies candidates during the PRI era reported that the national leadership forced them to stay in the districts for as long as two months. The candidates also explained that they were responsible for organizing campaign events, making alliances with local leaders, connecting with mayors and governors, and most

importantly, brokering between the local, state, and national government offices and the local community leaders. Many of the candidates' duties were organized in conjunction with mayors and local sectoral groups, but in many areas, the sectors were not strong or were unwilling to support the candidate. Moreover, even where the sectors were present, the candidates were ultimately responsible for organizing the campaign.

Rather than offer programmatic platforms, the deputy candidates acted as brokers between the community leaders who could deliver votes and the decision-making or resource rich agencies at all levels of government, from local and state governments to the national bureaucracy; that is, they provided *gestoría*.¹⁴ The keys to the legislative campaigns were small meetings with community leaders and mass rallies held in different towns in the district. Small meetings were organized to renew the alliances between local leaders and the PRI regime in Mexico City, using the deputy candidate as a go-between. Local leaders included those with money, such as business owners and those with neighborhood influence, such as leaders of the markets, and in certain districts, local sectoral leaders. The candidate's team found "natural leaders" in the community such as doctors, priests, pharmacists, and teachers, who were on good terms with many of the residents and recruited them to work for their campaigns.¹⁵ These local notables were also vital communication lifelines in that no one knew the problems of the neighborhood better than they. The regime was able to uncover any political problems through their contacts with these local notables. These local community leaders were also crucial because they were in charge of the demand side of *gestoría*: they asked for a paved road, sewage pipes, or public lighting, and would mobilize voters in return.¹⁶

To supplement the small meetings with local leaders, PRI candidates relied on mass rallies to publicize the elections. These rallies were important for several reasons:

first, they showed public enthusiasm for the candidate and the party; second, they demonstrated the candidate's organizational abilities to party leaders; and finally, they constituted a trial run for the mobilization efforts on election day. The rallies involved busing hundreds of poorer citizens to the site and making them sit through the speeches. In districts where a corporatist sector was involved, the candidate could rely on these organizations to plan the rally.¹⁷ But where a sector was absent, the candidate's team of friends, family, or hired students helped organize the rallies, often working with the mayor of the locality.

The advertising campaign consisted of painted walls (*bardas*), flyers and posters with the candidate's name and picture, and interviews with both radio stations and newspapers. The PRI candidates had enormous advantages in terms of communication. Because the PRI candidate had more money than his opposition rival, he could pay for low-cost advertising, such as posters and billboards, while the newspapers and radio by and large only covered PRI candidates, ignoring opposition rivals. The legendary *bardas* were an important element of the struggle to reach voters in the absence of more modern forms of communication and they were painted by the candidate's personal team or sectoral volunteers.¹⁸ Because opposition parties often had no other form of reaching voters with the names and colors of their parties, conflicts erupted constantly over who had the right to paint where, with roving bands of local PRI workers painting over opposition *bardas*.¹⁹

The national leadership of the PRI was responsible for monitoring the campaigns of its candidates, and sanctioning those who were not campaigning properly.²⁰ In the campaigns that were concurrent with the presidential contest, the national organization was far more active in assuring that the different elements of the party structure were mobilized for fear of looking incompetent in front of the PRI's presidential candidate,

and therefore the future president of the nation. In terms of monitoring from the national level, campaign evaluations often took the form of asking the candidate how many lunches he had organized and attended.²¹ This seemed to be the true measure of how to reach the voters, the sectoral leaders, and the community's notables. The CEN kept tabs on the performance of its candidates via a hierarchy of delegates and the state party leadership.²² A regional delegate monitored up to five states, the state delegate kept up with the activities of the candidates in each federal entity, and the CEN's delegate was the major link between the candidate and the national party. If the district was considered vulnerable, then a special delegate was sent down to manage the campaign.²³

Three interrelated factors are responsible for the transformations seen in congressional campaigning: first, rising electoral competition that makes a larger number of districts competitive; second, the infusion of public money from IFE into congressional races; and third, the set of electoral reforms during the 1990s – culminating in the 1996 reform – that reduced the massive fraud that marred electoral results during much of the hegemonic period, but especially in the 1980s.

The role of the CEN in modern, competitive congressional campaigns has become strikingly different that it was under hegemony, and far more modernized than the campaigns run by most candidates in their districts. According to interviews with both members of the CEN and candidates in the modern era, the national leadership's most important role is to manage the national mass media appeals (both television and radio spots). The millions of pesos that are funneled through the CEN and the availability of advanced technologies of communication, especially televised advertising have obligated the NPL to focus on devising and improving their national media appeals. Both the desire to maintain control over party finances and to raise

electoral support across the nation, have convinced the party's leaders not to devolve advertising responsibilities to the state or district levels. This tendency has kept money out of the district races, and as a consequence, the district media appeals are far less developed than those designed to sell the party as a whole.

Mexico's electoral laws dictate that the Lower House of Congress is made up of 300 deputies elected in single member districts and 200 in five multi-member PR districts that are chosen from closed lists with a single ballot. The parties have limited resources to spread over these 300 plurality races in uninominal districts. The PRI's spending strategy is designed to win both votes and districts because of the mixed plurality-PR electoral system. In a pure plurality system, one should expect to see the parties spend resources on those closely fought districts in which they could either win or lose, leaving the hopeless races and the already-won districts with less money (Jacobson 1985).

However, in Mexico, because of the two-tiered electoral system, the parties must spend money in a wider range of districts.²⁴ The second-tier PR allocation is based on the lower-tier plurality vote: there are not two separate ballots for each type of seat. Therefore, all plurality seats, both those that are hopeless or easily won, must deliver the maximum vote count possible to win a larger number of votes in the regional PR district to gain more seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Some districts are more important than others not so much because of the number of voters, but because of the numbers of assured PRI voters.²⁵ The national party still has strong incentives to make sure candidates win the maximum number of votes, even if they lose the district.

The second most important task is to provide the candidates with information that takes the form of district level opinion polls that are held at various points in the campaign and precinct level voting histories. The national leadership is also becoming

more active in unifying campaign styles, messages, and image and the CEN sends out guides at the beginning of the campaign to each congressional hopeful that delineate strategies that are suitable for different types of districts. For the most part, candidates are allowed to pick and choose what messages they will emphasize in their individual campaigns and which ones they will ignore.²⁶

Most of the national party leaders insist that candidate image does not matter in electoral results because of the prohibition against consecutive reelection. At the same time, most of the governors are careful to choose candidates in their states with some sort of local experience, and often prepare allies by giving them local positions so they can win a deputy election, meaning the local leaders do believe that candidates with local political experience will have a better chance at defeating the opposition. And many of the candidates interviewed used their prior experience in the locality as a selling point to voters.²⁷ There is some amount of tension between the NPL and the deputy candidates over the amount of money sent down by the IFE to the individual campaigns: several candidates complained bitterly that the CEN either did not send enough resources to campaign properly or would not allow them to report the spending. Much of this tension comes from the fact that the CEN wants to keep control over the campaign finances and spend most of it in national appeals, while the candidates want more to spend on district-level electioneering.

In competitive districts, the candidates rely heavily on recent voting histories as a guide to where they must concentrate their get-out-the-vote activities.²⁸ In the precincts in which the PRI has a strong base, the candidates can rely on more general appeals and send in paid campaign workers. In those districts with close vote margins, the candidates tend to use a “door-to-door” canvassing strategy.²⁹ If the district includes both rural and urban precincts, then there is a difference in strategy: house to house is

used in the urban areas, while the candidate depends more on natural leaders in the rural zones.³⁰ One former deputy provides a typical campaign day that focused on urban areas of his district:

1. A breakfast with businessmen.
2. A meeting with a women's group. These meetings had been previously organized by the campaign team, who would go around door-to-door stating that the candidate will be at such and such a place at a given time.
3. A visit with students near a school (the candidate can no longer go into the school).
4. A lunch with a group of older voters (pensionados).
5. Then, the candidate would go to a different neighbourhood and have an "acercamiento publico" which means a smaller rally with everyone from the community, with about 200-300 people. Every third day the candidate would hold one of these.
6. On certain days, door-to-door canvassing.³¹

The natural leaders in the rural areas tend to be co-partisan mayors, who many mentioned as the true base of the PRI (not the official party organization or a sector). Several deputies stated that they did use professional campaign services, at least for certain activities, such as image building, official campaign photographs of the candidate, and the radio spots.³² Almost all candidates mentioned that radio was by far the most important communication tool for mass appeals because it is cheap and reaches almost all voters (unlike television, which is far more expensive and covers an area much larger than the district in question).³³ Some candidates in wealthier districts used mass mailings and phone banks that they paid for themselves.³⁴

Just as during the hegemonic era, *gestoría* was an important part of campaigning: several mentioned that they tried to arrange services to their local voters before the election.³⁵ One former deputy describes it as a form of triangulation which is not illegal in any way: the candidate tries to get goods and services from other government agencies delivered to voters before the elections (and after if he is particularly active, but this is rarer).³⁶

Individual candidates in the districts have largely given up on the mass rallies that so characterized PRI district campaigns in the past, citing difficulties in mobilizing people to come to them, the expense of giving away small trinkets, and questioning whether these events have any positive effect on the final outcome.³⁷

VI. CONCLUSIONS.

When one asks the question: how well has the adapted to a massive change in its external environment (losing elections, the majorities in congress, and the presidency), the answer is variable. On the one hand, it still controls more governorships than the other two parties combined; it has not fragmented into several different parties (aside from the PANAL); it continues to win congressional races and which allows it to be a major player in forming majorities in the legislature; and finally, it is still a contender to win the presidential elections. On the other hand, the party is still seen as corrupt and self-serving; its factions tear it apart to win nominations; and its statutory rules are not seen as binding.

This work has shown that when speaking of party organization change, is not enough to refer to only one or two elements as many other works do, and that by examining a host of party activities, one can better understand which party actors were in control of which areas, their incentives, and the resources they could bring to bear in internal conflicts. By taking this disaggregated tack, the work had helped demonstrate

that the PRI was more successful in some areas – such as federal deputy selection, legislative recruitment, and campaigning - than others, especially executive nominations.

The party's governors have become enormously important actors within the PRI today, while union leaders (especially those at the local level) have been dealt with harshly by the rigors of electoral competition. Party activists continue as weak as they once were under hegemony. The national regime leaders (and later, the national party leadership) were willing to hand over a great deal of power to governors for several reasons. First, popular gubernatorial candidates who were denied the nomination could leave the party and convert PRI strongholds, such as Baja California Sur and Zacatecas into opposition bastions. Second, the governors are able to support local and federal elections in their respective states and so can demand selection control. And finally, the CEN has been able to maintain important prerogatives, over list candidates in the Chamber and the Senate, and over public resources.

A consistent source of conflict within the party has been in areas in which it has not been possible to divide up the pie among different groups, such as the presidential selection process. The lack of rules that are self enforcing obligates different party actors to cheat because there is not guarantee that others will not.

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¹ See Díaz-Cayeros (2006) for more on the fiscal relation between governors and the federal government.

² A famous case is that of Tlaquepaque, near Guadalajara in Jalisco. One family literally revolved different political posts among several relatives. See Hurtado (1993).

³ Interview with Mariano Palacios Alcocer, June 18, 2003, Mexico City.

⁴ In fact, Carlos Madrazo, as president of the CEN during the early days of Gustavo Díaz Ordáz's presidency (1964-1970), attempted to take away the control over local level nominations (mayors and local deputies) from the governors and hand this over to the local party activists. He lost his post as a result when governors fought back.

⁵ The rules for this primary held that the candidate who won a majority of districts would win the primary, not votes. This was an important consideration because PRI leaders believed that Madrazo's gubernatorial allies might be able to steal enough votes to trip up the semi-official candidate.

⁶ The 2005 primary was even more problematic than its 1999 antecessor: an anti-Madrazo alliance (Unidad Democrática) formed and decided it would choose a single candidate to run against the leader of the CEN in the primary so as to not divide the anti-Madrazo votes. When UD chose its candidate, Ricardo Montiel, information was leaked about his shady business dealings while governor of the state of Mexico, and he quickly dropped out, leaving only Madrazo. The problem for Madrazo was that most believed he had leaked the financial data to ruin his opponent, and that the image of leaders of the PRI as completely corrupt was reinforced. Then, a weak candidate emerged, which obligated the party to hold an expensive primary, even though the public knew it was a foregone conclusion that Madrazo would win, so neither he nor the party won any points for an internally democratic process.

⁷ The primary itself has taken two forms: the first is a race in which the winner of a majority of electoral districts gains the nominations, and the second is a plurality vote in a single national district. The second method helps those who can garner or steal (with the governors' assistance) large blocks of votes in a few states, while the first helps the candidate with a more dispersed support base and makes large-scale vote buying or stealing ineffective.

⁸ Tlaxcala and Nayarit follow this pattern, as did Michoacán under Beatriz Paredes' leadership (2007-).

⁹ Interview with Pedro Ojeda Paullada, March 1996, Mexico City.

¹⁰ Interview with former deputy Luis Díaz Medina, May 23, 2002 and former deputy Francisco Jiménez Merino, May 26, 2004.

¹¹ Interview with former deputy Jesus Maria Ramon, June 15, 2004.

¹² Interview with Mariano Palacios Alcocer, June 18, 2003.

¹³ The *official* distribution of PRI deputy affiliation for 1985 and 1997 are as follows: 1985, Popular sector, 48 percent, Workers, 14 percent and Peasant, 34. For 1997, the official distribution is, Popular sector, 50 percent, Workers, 11 percent, Peasant, 38 percent (Langston 1998).

¹⁴ Interview with Humberto Roque Villanueva, former member of the CEN and former federal deputy, Mexico City, November 17, 2003.

¹⁵ Interview with Fausto Zapata, former federal deputy, April 11, 2000 and Ruth Blanca Esponda, Mexico City, February, 2000, and Luís Medina, a former PRI deputy, September 26, 2001.

¹⁶ Interview with Jesús María Ramón, former federal deputy, Mexico City, June 15, 2004.

¹⁷ Interview with Luís Medina. Dulce María Sauri, former federal deputy and President of the CEN reports that the sectors were an important element in getting people to the mass rallies in her district, interview, Mexico City, September 10, 2003.

¹⁸ Interview with Dulce María Sauri.

¹⁹ Interview with Teofilo Arreola, a congressional candidate for the PAN in Jalisco in the 1970s, Mexico City, February 18, 2005.

²⁰ There were complaints that PRI deputy candidates who had close ties to national figures were not required to campaign because "they were busy in Mexico City".

²¹ Interview with María de las Heras, an electoral consultant with the party during the 1991 mid-term elections, November 22, 2001.

²² Interviews with Dulce María Sauri, September 10, 2003, and with Luís Medina, 2000.

²³ Interview with Roque Villanueva, November 17, 2003.

²⁴ Interview with Hector Hugo Olivares, former member of the CEN, February 24, 2000.

²⁵ There was a redistricting to even out the numbers of voters in the 300 majoritarian districts as a result of the 1996 reforms.

²⁶ Interview with former deputy Hugo Rodriguez, May 13, 2004.

²⁷ Former Deputy Francisco Jiménez Merino (from a rural district in Puebla) states that the governor had made him head of the state CNC to prepare him to run for federal deputy. Interview, May 26, 2004.

²⁸ Interview with former deputy Hugo Rodríguez, May 13, 2004.

²⁹ Former deputy Jose Luis Flores Hernández lays out the different strategies: in a precinct with few PRI voters, the candidate did little. In a PRI dominated precinct, the candidate just maintained his image with visits and small presents. In the competitive zones, he had to go all out using door-to-door canvassing radio advertising, visits to the market, and meetings with teachers. Interview, April 26, 2004.

³⁰ Interview with former deputy Humberto Cervantes, June 1, 2004.

³¹ Interview with Lazaro Arias Martinez, May 6, 2004.

³² Interview with former deputy Humberto Cervantes, June 1, 2004 and with Jesus Maria Ramon, June 15, 2004.

³³ Interview with Luis Díaz Medina, May 23, 2002 and Mario Zepahua, May 31, 2004.

³⁴ Interviews with former deputies Francisco Jiménez Merino, May 26, 2004 and Juan Carlos Perez Gongora, May 2004.

³⁵ Interview with former deputy Raul Mejia, May 27, 2004.

³⁶ Interview with former deputy Mario Zepahua, May 31, 2004.

³⁷ Interview with former deputy Jose Luis Flores Hernández, April 26, 2004 and with former deputy, Luis Díaz Medina, May 23, 2002.